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ABSTRACT: The ideal of shared decision making starts from the assumption that physicians and patients are able 
to take a joint decision as to what is the best treatment. However, since medical consultations are to be viewed as 
discussions between an expert and a layman, in practice it will often be the case that the patient has to rely on the 
physician’s expertise. In this article we examine the extent to which the Dutch laws, guidelines and professional 
conventions within the medical domain positively influence the quality of the process of shared decision making, 
even in cases where the physician makes use of an argument from expert opinion. To this end, we will chart some 
of the most important institutional safeguards for the quality of medical decisions and analyze how these 
safeguards relate to the critical questions associated with the argument scheme of argumentation from expert 
opinion. 
KEYWORDS: argument scheme, argumentation from expert opinion, critical questions, shared decision making, 
medical discussion, institutional safeguards. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For the last ten years it has been increasingly regarded desirable that the physician and the 
patient take a joint decision as to a safe and acceptable treatment for the patient by means of 
conducting a discussion. This process is also known as ‘shared decision making.’ In its ideal 
form, shared decision making is: 
[a] decision-making process jointly shared by patients and their health care provider, [which] relies 
on the best evidence about risks and benefits associated with all available options (including doing 
nothing) and on the values and preferences of patients, without excluding those of health 
professionals. (Légaré et al., 2008, p. 1) 
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 The process of shared decision making is one possible way to meet the legal requirement of 
informed consent. It is legally required for any treatment that the physician obtains permission 
from the patient, after having given the patient enough information for taking a decision on the 
matter. The new consultation format of shared decision making does not prevent the patient 
from having to rely on the expert opinion of the physician. Since in general, a medical 
consultation is to be characterized as a discussion between an expert and a layman, patients 
will rarely be able to assess the quality of the information and opinions of the physician 
directly. In the communicative activity type of a medical consultation, the expertise of the 
physician still plays a decisive role.  
 It is therefore important to analyze to what extent the laws, guidelines and 
professional conventions that relate to these consultations, offer a safeguard for the quality of 
the expert opinion put forward by the physician. In this article we will provide such an analysis 
from the perspective of argumentation theory. We reconstruct the appeal to expert opinion as 
‘argumentation from expert opinion’ and relate the abovementioned laws, guidelines and 
professional conventions to the different critical questions that are associated with this type of 
argumentation. 
 First, we will indicate how the asymmetrical relationship between physician and 
patient relates to the ideal of shared decision making (section 2). Then we will give a brief 
overview of the key critical questions that play a role in the assessment of so-called 
‘argumentation from expert opinion’ (section 3). Taking these critical questions as a starting 
point, we will then list a number of institutional safeguards for the quality of medical decisions 
(section 4). Finally, we will summarize our findings (section 5).  
2. SHARED DECISION MAKING 
In the literature it is generally assumed that shared decision making has a positive influence on 
the quality of medical decisions. Rather than confining themselves to informing the patient 
about the various treatment options and their pros and cons, physicians actually discuss the 
options with the patient (Charles, Gafni, & Whelan, 1997). Since during the process physicians 
are also supposed to tell their patients which treatment they prefer and why, in the process of 
shared decision making the physician not only provides information, but also argumentation. 
As a result, the expertise of the physician is more fully utilized. In addition, shared decision 
making is recommended because it often leads to more satisfaction with the consultation and 
improved therapy compliance.1 Patients feel more involved in the decision about their 
treatment because the physician allows them to participate in the discussion and to put forward 
their own preferences.  
 From an argumentation theoretical point of view, the requirement that the physician 
should discuss the available treatment options with the patient can be seen as an institutional 
obligation with respect to the burden of proof regarding medical decisions (Goodnight, 2006; 
Mohammed & Snoeck Henkemans, 2012). The main reason to impose this burden of proof 
upon the physician is that in medical consultations there usually is an ‘asymmetric’ 
                                                
1  This is especially the case in decisions about long-term treatments, like chronic diseases. See Joosten et al., 
2008, p. 224. 
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relationship between the discussants.2 This means that the discussants do not have the same 
knowledge of the topic of discussion: the physician is an expert, and the patient is a layman.3 
 In some cases, this asymmetry makes it impossible for the ideal of shared decision 
making to be realized completely, because the physician will not be able to comply with the 
institutional burden of proof in all respects. Depending on the degree of difference in expertise, 
at some point in the discussion the physician will have to refrain from providing a substantive 
or ‘direct’ defense of his position and will have to appeal to his expertise.4 
 In an indefinite context, contributions to the discussion can be analyzed as 
argumentation from expert opinion when there is an explicit appeal to expertise. In the more 
specific context of the medical consultation, we believe also other contributions to the 
discussion can under certain conditions be reconstructed as this type of argumentation. This is 
the case when the physician chooses not to further defend a (sub) standpoint—e.g., by merely 
repeating or confirming his standpoint—while the responses from the patient indicate that the 
standpoint does need further support. An example of such a situation would be the following 
fragment adapted from Ariss (2009, p. 914):  
D: And I don’t want to see your blood pressure for six months, I don’t wanna know about it. 
P: Ohf. Are yuh sure? 
D: Absolu- Yes absolutely fine.  
In an indefinite context, the reply of the physician (D) in turn 3 to the question of the patient 
(P) in turn 2 would be evaluated as an evasion of the burden of proof. In the specific context of 
the medical consultation, however, it is more appropriate to reconstruct the physician’s 
response as an implicit argument from expert opinion. For the patient, by having requested the 
consultation in the first place, has already indicated that he is prepared to rely on the 
physician’s expertise.  
 The patient’s lack of expertise may render it impossible for him at some point in the 
discussion to determine the acceptability of the physician’s standpoint in a direct, substantive 
manner. This, however, does not mean that the patient is forced to accept the physician’s 
standpoint regarding the diagnosis, prognosis or treatment without further consideration. Apart 
from in a direct, substantive way, an expert opinion can also be assessed in an indirect way. 
According to Goldman (2001, p. 93), a layman may check the extent to which the expert 
opinion is consistent with that of other experts, what results have been achieved by the expert 
so far, and whether there is a conflict of interests.  
 We believe that these indirect assessment possibilities can be transformed into criteria 
for assessing the reasonableness of argumentation from expert opinion. Within the field of 
argumentation theory, such criteria generally take the form of a series of critical questions (see 
for instance Walton, 1997; Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008; Wagemans, 2011). In the context 
of the medical consultation, the general rule is that the more opportunity there is for the patient 
                                                
2  According to Ariss (2009) it is not only the factual difference in knowledge that hinders an equal participation 
to the decision process, but also the view of both doctors and patients that the doctor has more epistemic 
authority.  
3  By ‘expert’ we mean someone who is a professional expert and by ‘layman’ we mean someone who is not a 
professional expert. Of course, a layman can be an expert by expertise. 
4  Goodwin & Honeycutt (2009, pp. 27–28) say that whenever scientists in the context of a public debate choose 
to not give arguments but appeal to their authority, the laity does not have enough incentive to draw a 
conclusion that is based on their own analysis of the material. 
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to determine whether the criteria for the reasonableness of argumentation from expert opinion 
have been met, the more fully the ideal of shared decision making can be realized—even in 
cases where the physician explicitly or implicitly appeals to his expertise.  
3. CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
Argumentation from expert opinion is a type of argumentation in which the protagonist 
supports the standpoint that a certain opinion is acceptable (A is true of O) with the argument 
that the opinion at issue has been put forward by an expert (P is true of O).5 The standpoint (1), 
argument (1.1), and acceptability transfer principle (1.1´) involved in this type of 
argumentation can be represented in the following way:  
1 A is true of O 
1.1 P is true of O 
1.1´ The fact that P is true of O renders acceptable that A is true of O  
 
O = opinion  
A = being acceptable  
P = being put forward by an expert in the relevant field 
Viewed from a pragma-dialectical perspective, the antagonist in response to an argument from 
expert opinion may call the propositional content of the argument (1.1) as well as the 
justificatory force of the argument (1.1´) into question. The first type of criticism can be 
represented as a question in the following way: 
1.1? Has the opinion at issue indeed been put forward by an expert in the relevant field? 
 This critical question concerning the propositional content of the argument can be 
further differentiated. A first sub-question is whether the person who has expressed the opinion 
is indeed an expert in the relevant field. It may be the case that he is not in fact an expert, or in 
a different field than that to which the opinion belongs. The second issue is whether the person 
in question has indeed put forward the opinion mentioned in the standpoint.  
 The second type of criticism that the antagonist may put forward in response to 
argumentation from expert opinion relates to the justificatory force of the argument at issue 
(1.1´). This type of criticism can be formulated as follows:  
1.1´? Does the fact that the opinion has been put forward by an expert in the relevant field indeed 
render the opinion acceptable? 
 This critical question can be further differentiated as well. A first sub-question is 
whether it is indeed the case that the expert has voiced his opinion primarily from his own 
expertise and not from his personal interest. A second issue is whether the expert is able to 
defend his opinion in a way different from referring to his expertise. And a third sub-question 
is whether experts in the same field agree as to the acceptability of the opinion expressed in the 
standpoint. 
                                                
5  This section is based on Wagemans (2011), who takes ‘argumentation from expert opinion’ to be a type of 
‘argumentation from authority’ and specifies the associated critical questions by incorporating Walton’s 
(1997) critical questions into a pragma-dialectical framework. 
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 Summarizing, the sub-questions regarding the propositional content of the argument 
raise doubt with respect to the expertise of the person and the accuracy of the representation of 
his opinion. The sub-questions regarding the justificatory force of the argument respectively 
raise doubt about the personal reliability of the expert, the presence of further evidence for the 
acceptability of the opinion, and the consistency of the opinion with that of other experts in the 
field. In practice, of course, the antagonist may also express doubt regarding a combination of 
these issues. 
4. INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS 
In the previous section we indicated that the acceptability of argumentation from expert 
opinion can be established by checking whether the relevant critical questions for this type of 
argumentation can be answered in the affirmative. If this is the case, accepting the standpoint 
defended by the physician may in principle be considered as reasonable, which is beneficial to 
the realization of the ideal of shared decision making. 
 In this section, we will give a number of examples of institutional safeguards for the 
reasonableness of argumentation from expert opinion. It is our aim to show that these 
safeguards may be interpreted as an institutionalized anticipation of the critical questions 
pertaining to argumentation from expert opinion. 
 In what follows, we propose to make a distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ 
institutional safeguards. A safeguard is ‘direct’ if it provides the patient with some assurance 
that the answer to a particular critical question will be affirmative. A safeguard is ‘indirect’ if it 
offers patients the possibility to investigate themselves whether the answer to a certain critical 
question is affirmative or not. 
4.1 The Physician’s Expertise 
The first critical question that can be raised concerning argumentation from expert opinion is: 
‘Has the opinion at issue indeed been put forward by an expert in the relevant field?’ Since the 
type of discussions that are at issue in this paper generally speaking involve a reference to the 
speaker’s own opinion, and not to that of another expert, the question whether or not the person 
concerned has really put forward the opinion is not of importance to our analysis.6 In what 
follows we will therefore concentrate on those safeguards that can be related to the first sub- 
question: ‘Is the person who put forward the opinion indeed an expert in the relevant field?’ 
 According to Goldman (2001, p. 93) a novice can evaluate the expertise of an expert 
by relying on the judgments of ‘meta-experts.’ In this category of judgments Goldman includes 
formal forms of recognition, such as certificates and diplomas. Another way in which the 
novice can evaluate the expertise of an expert is by gathering information about the expert’s 
track record. 
 Some institutional rules and guidelines within the Dutch healthcare system offer a 
number of direct safeguards that are comparable to the judgments of meta-experts. One 
                                                
6  See Pilgram (2012), who makes a distinction between argumentation from authority (when reference is made 
to someone else’s authority), and argumentation by authority (when reference is made to the speaker’s own 
authority). In the case of the latter type of argumentation by authority, Pilgram regards the question of whether 
the authority has been correctly represented only relevant in cases in which the doctor refers to statements 
made by him or herself at an earlier occasion. 
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example is the Dutch law for professions in the individual health care (BIG). This law aims to 
protect patients against incompetent and negligent treatment by health care providers. 
Healthcare providers are obliged to enroll in an official register and may only carry a protected 
medical title and practice, if they have been registered. It is checked by a special committee so 
that only medical specialists in the possession of a “recent competence” are registered. 
Professionals registered in the medical register are governed by the relevant disciplinary rules.7
 In order to be able to enroll in the medical register, the physician must satisfy the 
relevant medical requirements for his or her own specialty. Roughly speaking these 
requirements encompass that the specialist must have followed an education for a couple of 
years in an authorized hospital. Medical specialists—as of 2012, other health care professionals 
as well—are obliged to renew their registration every five years. In order to be able to do so, 
the specialist must meet the minimum criteria of having regularly cared for patients, of having 
participated in the relevant inspection programs, and of having followed a minimum number of 
hours of accredited post-graduate courses and refresher trainings. 
 A second direct safeguard for the expertise of the medical expert is the Dutch law 
concerning the medical treatment contract (WGBO). This law became valid in 1995 and aims 
to strengthen the patient’s position. Article 453 of this law runs as follows (our translation): 
Health care providers should provide good medical care and should act in accordance with their 
responsibilities that follow from the professional standard of health care professionals. 
The code of conduct for physicians of the Royal Dutch Society of Medicine (KNMG) provide 
a further specification of what it means to provide good medical care. For the expertise of the 
physician rule I.3 and I.5 in particular are relevant:  
I.3 The care that is provided should be of good quality. Relevant aspects in this connection are: 
expertise, efficacy and efficiency, patient centeredness, accuracy and safety. The physician should 
keep the medical knowledge and skills of his own specialization up to standard. Postgraduate 
education and refresher courses are a necessity in this respect.  
I.5 The physician should take care not to cross the boundaries of the execution of his professional 
duty. He should refrain from performing actions and making statements that fall outside the scope 
of his own expertise. 
In combination with the law itself, the code of conduct for physicians ensures that the expertise 
of the physician is a legal imperative. 
 Apart from these direct safeguards, there are also a number of indirect institutional 
guarantees that can be seen as relating to the sub-question about expertise. One example is that 
patients may check in the medical register whether their health care provider is indeed 
registered. They also have access to a so called ‘black list’ which contains the names of 
physicians and other health care professionals that have been suspended or have been expelled 
from their profession by the disciplinary judge.  
 In recent years more and more initiatives have been taken to give patients instruments 
with which they can check the quality of health care. Examples are internet sites on which 
comparisons between various health care providers are published, and sites in which patients’ 
experiences are made public. 
                                                
7  This section is based on information drawn from various websites concerning the Dutch health care system, 
a.o. http://orde.artsennet.nl/Opleiding-4/Registratie_en_herregistratie.htm; http://knmg.artsennet.nl/Nieuws/ 
Nieuwsarchief/Nieuwsbericht-1/Relaties-transparant.htm. 
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4.2 The Physician’s Reliability 
The second critical question that can be raised in the case of argumentation from expert 
opinion is: “Does the fact that the opinion has been put forward by an expert in the relevant 
field indeed render the opinion acceptable?” The first relevant sub-question is whether or not 
the judgment of the expert is unbiased. 
 There are several factors that can endanger the independence and integrity of the 
physician, such as financial and other types of reward, research interests, pressure from the 
organization for which the physician works and personal contacts. These factors can influence 
the treatment given to the patient, but also the type of research that is carried out and the 
presentation of the results of this research.  
 An example of a direct institutional safeguard related to this sub-question is the oath 
that most physicians and health care professionals have to take when they receive their medical 
qualification. This oath can be seen as a standard for the moral self-regulation of the 
professional group. In the Netherlands, physicians are no longer legally required to take the 
oath, nor does not taking the oath have consequences for the inscription in the medical register. 
Nonetheless, the oath is still seen as decisive for physicians’ decisions and for the patients’ 
trust in their physicians (CHA, 2009).  
 Originally, the Physicians’ oath was based on the Hippocratic Oath, but since 2003, in 
the Netherlands, the Hippocratic Oath has been replaced by a more modern version. In a 
commentary on this new oath, van Everdingen and Horstmanshoff make the following 
observations: 
Apart from a personal declaration about the physician’s devotion to the patient, the text of the new 
physicians’ oath also refers to aspects of the relationship with society and contains a number of new 
elements that are related to present-day discussions about professional ethics. Examples of such 
elements are the testable attitude of the physician (openness about data concerning the performance 
and about complaints and errors) and the recognition of one’s own limitations (referring to other 
specialists on time). On the other hand, there are a number of actual problems that are not raised, 
such as the pressure of free market processes on professional ethics and the execution of scientific 
research in relation with the pharmaceutical industry (2005, p. 1066, our translation).  
There are also a number of legal rules that aim to prevent different forms of conflicts of 
interest. The Dutch law concerning the medical treatment contract (WGBO), for instance, does 
pay attention to the actual problems that were just mentioned. This becomes clear if one looks 
at two articles of this law which aim to prevent conflicts of interest in carrying out scientific 
research and in maintaining contacts with the business world: 
IV.4 When doing scientific research, the physician always puts the patient’s interest before his 
research interest so as to avoid any conflict of interest that may harm the patient. The physician only 
accepts recompense for the research in so far as this is proportional to the efforts that have been put 
in. 
V.I The physician maintains an open and honest relationship with the business world and prevents 
conflicts of interest that may harm the patient. Accepting favors is only acceptable to a limited 
extent, in accordance with the standards in the Code of conduct of the Foundation Code drugs 
advertisements. 
Apart from such direct safeguards, there are also indirect institutional guarantees for the 
reliability of the physician. One example is the initiative taken by a group of organizations in 
health care in October 2011 to develop a uniform code in order to prevent both improper 
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influencing in cases of medical advice and development of protocols that may result from 
conflicts of interest between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry. Since it is 
unavoidable that there will be interests at stake, the organizations concerned believe that 
optimal transparency is the most appropriate means to combat inappropriate influencing: in this 
way it becomes possible to make the interests visible and checkable. 
 In 2005 a study group of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences 
(KNAW) published a report with recommendations for doing commissioned research. One of 
the most important recommendations of the study group was to sign a “Declaration of 
independence”: 
With this written declaration, client and researchers promise to stick to a number of rules that will 
guarantee the independence of the scientific research. A person acting contrary to this declaration 
breaks his public and explicit promise, which must lead to sanctions after this has been reported to a 
national body (2005, p. 2, our translation). 
This declaration is a direct safeguard for the independence of scientific research. The same 
report also mentions a measure that could be seen as an example of an indirect guarantee. In a 
combined editorial, a number of leading international medical journals have laid down that 
they will require all authors to sign a declaration in which they promise to mention their 
potentially conflicting interests in their scientific publications. 
4.3 Additional Evidence and Consistency 
The second and third sub-question with respect to the justificatory force of argumentation from 
expert opinion are the question whether the expert has further evidence for the opinion and the 
question of whether the expert’s judgment is consistent with that of other experts. In this 
section we will give a number of examples of direct and indirect institutional safeguards that 
can be related to these sub-questions. 
 An important direct guarantee that is related to both sub-questions is the rules 
concerning Evidence Based Medicine (EBM). These rules are aimed at ensuring that the 
patient has some guarantee that the opinion of the consulted expert is in accordance with the 
current knowledge of experts in the same field. EBM is “the conscientious, explicit and 
judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual 
patients” (Sackett, Rosenberg, Muir Gray, Haynes, & Scott Richardson, 1996, p. 71). In the 
Dutch law concerning the medical treatment contract (WGBO), the following stipulation 
concerning EBM can be found: 
I.6 The physician is prepared to account for his opinions and to adopt a testable attitude. Guiding 
principle for this test is the criterion “customary practice among professional colleagues.” The 
implementation of this criterion should be by an accredited scientific association. 
This quote makes clear that the rules governing EBM do not just constitute a direct safeguard 
for an affirmative answer to the question about further evidence for the physician’s opinion, 
but also for the question about whether the expert’s opinion is consistent with that of other 
experts. 
 As regards the indirect safeguards, the asymmetrical relationship between physician 
and patient will in many cases make it impossible for the patient himself to check whether the 
physician’s opinion is based on further evidence. The recent publication of summaries of 
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guidelines for medical specialists in non-technical language by a cooperative of the Dutch 
scientific associations for medical specialists may be seen as an attempt at giving the patient 
the opportunity to check whether his physician’s opinions are in accordance with the medical 
evidence, and consistent with the opinions of other experts in the relevant field. 
 By far the most important indirect safeguard for the consistency of the expert’s 
opinion with that of other experts are the regulations with respect to the so-called ‘second 
opinion.’ In the aforementioned Dutch law concerning the medical treatment contract (WGBO, 
II.19), it is specified that a physician should comply with the patient’s request to be referred to 
another health professional for a second opinion, unless there are weighty considerations 
against doing so, which should then be made explicit and motivated. Since patients thus have 
the right to ask for a second opinion, they have the possibility of checking whether the first 
expert’s opinion is consistent with the second expert’s opinion. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have shown that the institutional guidelines and procedures within the medical 
field can be related in a meaningful way to argumentation theoretical standards for the 
reasonableness of argumentation from expert opinion. On the basis of this research it may be 
concluded that the asymmetrical relationship between the physician (the expert) and the patient 
(the layman) does not necessarily put the ideal of shared decision making at risk. Even in cases 
where a direct assessment of the physician’s opinion is not possible and the patient has to rely 
solely on the physician’s expertise, the reasonableness of the judgment is to a large extent 
guaranteed. This is done both by direct safeguards, which can be viewed as assessments of 
argumentation from expert opinion that have been delegated to the institution, and by indirect 
safeguards, which enable patients to evaluate the reasonableness of this type of argumentation 
themselves. Of course, physicians will always have to meet the minimum requirements for 
informed consent, which means that they should allow their patients to give their consent for 
the treatment on the basis of an understanding of the facts, implications and consequences of 
the treatment proposed. Whenever the explicit or implicit appeal to expertise obstructs this 
understanding, without there being an adequate justification for it, the appeal is not only 
contrary to the ideal of shared decision making, but also contrary to the legal requirement of 
informed consent.  
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